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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE et
- al. v. MONTANA et al.
- appeal from the united states district court for
- the district of montana
- No. 91-860. Argued March 4, 1992-Decided March 31, 1992
-
- Article I, 2, of the Constitution requires apportionment of Representa-
- tives among the States ``according to their respective Numbers.'' A
- 1941 federal statute provides that after each decennial census ``the
- method known as the method of equal proportions'' shall be used to
- determine the number of Representatives to which each State is
- entitled. Application of that method to the 1990 census caused
- Montana to lose one of its two seats in the House of Representatives.
- If it had retained both seats, each district would have been closer to
- the ideal size of a congressional district than the reapportioned single
- district. The State and several of its officials (hereinafter Montana)
- sued appropriate federal defendants (hereinafter the Government) in
- the District Court, alleging, inter alia, that the existing apportion-
- ment method violates Article I, 2. A three-judge court, convened
- pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284, granted Montana summary judgment
- on this claim, holding the statute unconstitutional because the
- variance between the single district's population and that of the ideal
- district could not be justified under the ``one-person, one-vote'' stan-
- dard developed in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, and other
- intrastate districting cases.
- Held:Congress exercised its apportionment authority within the limits
- dictated by the Constitution. Pp.4-24.
- (a)The general admonition in Article I, 2, that apportionment be
- made ``according to [the States'] respective numbers'' is constrained
- by three constitutional requirements: the number of Representatives
- shall not exceed one for every 30,000 persons; each State shall have
- at least one Representative; and district boundaries may not cross
- state lines. In light of those constraints and the problem of fractional
- remainders-i. e., the fractional portion of the number that results
- when the State's total population is divided by the population of the
- ideal district must either be disregarded or treated as equal to one
- Representative because each State must be represented by a whole
- number of legislators-Congress has considered and either rejected
- or adopted various apportionment methods over the years, the most
- recent method tried being the method of equal proportions, also
- known as the ``Hill Method.'' A National Academy of Sciences
- committee recommended that method as the fairest of the five
- methods the committee felt could lead to a workable solution to the
- fractional remainder problem. If Congress had chosen the method of
- the harmonic mean, also known as the ``Dean Method,'' Montana
- would have received a second seat after the 1990 census. Pp.4-13.
- (b)This Court rejects the Government's argument that Congress'
- selection of any of the alternative apportionment methods presents
- a ``political question'' that is not subject to judicial review under the
- standards set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217. Signifi-
- cantly, the Government does not suggest that all congressional
- decisions relating to apportionment are beyond judicial review, but
- merely argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the
- Constitution requires the greatest possible equality in the size of
- congressional districts, as measured by absolute deviation from ideal
- district size. Thus, the controversy here turns on the proper inter-
- pretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. As in Baker itself
- and the apportionment cases that followed, the political question
- doctrine does not place this kind of constitutional interpretation
- outside the proper domain of the Judiciary. Pp.14-17.
- (c)Congress had ample power to enact the statutory procedure at
- issue and to apply the Hill Method after the 1990 census. It is by
- no means clear that the facts here establish a violation of the Wes-
- berry one-person, one-vote standard. Although Montana's evidence
- demonstrated that application of the Dean Method would decrease
- the absolute deviation from the ideal district size, it also would
- increase the relative difference between the ideal and the size of the
- districts both in Montana and in Washington, the only State that
- would have lost a Representative under the Dean Method. Wes-
- berry's polestar of equal representation does not provide sufficient
- guidance to determine what is the better measure of inequality.
- Moreover, while subsequent intrastate districting cases have inter-
- preted the Wesberry standard as imposing a burden on the States to
- make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality,
- that goal is rendered illusory for the Nation as a whole by the
- constraints imposed by Article I, 2: the guarantee of a minimum
- of one representative for each State and the need to allocate a fixed
- number of indivisible Representatives among 50 States of varying
- populations. The constitutional framework that generated the need
- for a compromise between the interests of larger and smaller States
- must also delegate to Congress a measure of discretion broader than
- that accorded to the States, and Congress' apparently good-faith
- decision to adopt the Hill Method commands far more deference,
- particularly as it was made after decades of experience, experimenta-
- tion, and debate, was supported by independent scholars, and has
- been accepted for a half century. Pp.17-24.
- 775 F.Supp. 1358, reversed.
-
- Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
-